Politic Hub: September 2011

Ijaz butt the former Pakistan test cricketer and present chair man of Pakistan Cricket Board (Deserving or Not all knows).

His playing career consists of 8 test matches and 0 ODI match. If we look upon the administrative career of Ijaz butt then we came to know that it started from 8 October 2008. His administrative career is full of controversies. Pakistan lost the hosting of ICC WC 2011 due to attack on Sri-Lankan Team. Another controversy is the spot fixing and ban on three players including an emerging bowler Mohammad Amir.

The weak statements of Ijaz Butt and the ashamed behavior was the cause of ban on players. Duty of Ijaz Butt was to save Pakistani Players by taking some action and backing the players. According to me Ijaz Butt and the PCB officials are responsible for the ban on players. They should have taken some action before ICC to save Pakistan new talent and Pakistan cricket.

His era is full of controversies. His contract is going to its end on 8th October. But a Question is there i.e. “Contract will be extended or not”.

He has strong approach in the politics. This Approach is saving him all the time. His Brother in Law and the Defense Minister of Pakistan Ahmad Mukhtar is the Key-man in extension of his contract.

According to mine analysis, I have made some guesses. According to me after 8th October there will be no more Ijaz Butt in PCB. Javed Miandad (former cricketer and Coach) will be back in the management. Shahid Khan Afridi will be back in the team to serve the nation with his talent of batting and bowling.

Let see what will happen on 8th of October. Please give your feedback on this column and let me know about future of Pakistan cricket in your opinion.

What do you think will Ijaz Butt be able to stick with the PCB???????

Future of Ijaz Butt, Javed Miandad & Shahid Afridi By Hamza Zaidi

No one can work the engines of patriotism better than the army and its ideological wing, the ISI. In actual combat their performance may invite questions. But in ideological combat their skill is unsurpassed.
In the annals of Pakistani democracy no fiction is more endearing than that of parliamentary sovereignty. The army and ISI set the score and music of national security. Civilian governments and politicians perform vigorously to this music and call it parliamentary sovereignty.
The corps commanders led the national outrage over the Kerry-Lugar bill, the jihadi media taking its cue from there. We know what deft hands first generated and then dissipated the hype over the Raymond Davis affair. Left to itself the federal government might have handled matters differently. But then the ISI wouldn’t have been the ISI if it had allowed this to happen.
When Sheikh Osama’s hideout was busted in Abbottabad, the first reaction of both President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani was sensible. But they weren’t counting on the deep sense of humiliation felt in General Headquarters. Realising their error they changed tack and hurriedly joined the national chorus of patriotism which had begun belting out lines about wounded sovereignty.
Few people paused to ask whether the sharper blow to national pride was dealt by the Americans or the Sheikh who, with his computers and disk drives, had installed himself in Abbottabad for close on five years. Where lesser mortals might have directed their anger at Al-Qaeda we went blue in the face denouncing America.
No praise is too high for Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the ISI chief, for playing the subsequent in-camera session of parliament the way he did. Towards its end most of the parliamentarians seemed to be eating out of his hands, all speaking the same language of honour and national pride with which he had prefaced his briefing.
Now in the latest outbreak of patriotic fever in the wake of Admiral Mike Mullen’s excoriating remarks about the Haqqani group and its real or presumed linkages to the ISI, it is again the army and ISI orchestrating the national response, and the government and much of the political class following suit and reading from the script prepared by the supreme guardians.
The corps commanders met first and Prime Minister Gilani swung into action later, calling up the assorted characters who presume to speak on behalf of the Pakistani people, and inviting them for an all-parties conference (APC). If past experience is any guide, there are few activities more pointless than this gathering of the good and the not-so-great. It is safe to say – these lines being written before this momentous event – that the emphasis will be on verbosity and beating the drums of national honour. At the end will come the refrain, the nation stands united.
The Pakistani nation caught up in the throes of patriotism is usually a dangerous sight – mostly a prelude to something bizarre and foolish. What a mood of excitement we built up in 1965, closing our eyes to the reality that our rulers of the time, for no rhyme or reason, had started the whole blooming adventure. No one punished them but the country is still, in myriad ways, living the consequences.
In 1971 every vehicle in Lahore carried the sticker “Crush India”. We know who was crushed and who wasn’t in that conflict. The Afghan jihad, the conflict in Kargil, our predilection with managing the affairs of Afghanistan, when everything points to the conclusion that we are far from able to manage our own….the list of our militant follies is endless.
The US may be using too broad a brush and putting too thick a coat of paint on our warped strategic theories, but there is a growing body of opinion in Pakistan itself that the time for our strategic games is up. Mike Mullen did not say the ISI was attacking Kabul. We should read his testimony more dispassionately. He was saying the culprits were from the Haqqani group and that this group had strong links with the ISI.
Who the intrepid soul who would deny this last point? Don’t the Haqqanis have havens on this side of the border? The ISI doesn’t micro-manage them, it has no operational control over them. But in the name of all that is profane, don’t they have a presence there and here?
They are assets for the future, our strategic grandmasters will say. Haven’t we played enough of Afghan games and isn’t it time to let that unfortunate country be on its own? No one should wish more misfortunes upon the Afghan people but if they must fight their own internecine wars what drives us to the necessity of being a part of them, directly or indirectly?
Not only is it high time the army redrew its priorities, it is also time it stopped forcing its theories on hapless civilian governments. Every malevolent adjective in the world this government – indeed the entire political class – richly deserves. We have a set of ineffectual people at the helm, their capacity and competence no secret to anyone. But, I would venture to suggest, that even these clowns, if left to do their own bit, would manage relations with the US better than our brilliant army commanders.
There is no more difficult negotiating partner in the world than the MQM. He who can handle the MQM can deal with anyone, even the spirits of the dark and the deep. If we settled for cheap terms and low wages in 2001, broad-chested generals were in charge of national affairs not weak-kneed civilians. When the time was for negotiating something sensible and equitable with the Americans our army command blew it. Now when events have moved on and a new dynamic is in play, the army command just refuses to dismount from the high stallion of national honour and inviolable sovereignty.
What kind of a country are we? After India tested its nuclear bombs in 1998 Lal Kishan Advani only had to make a few threatening statements for Pakistan to go into panic mode and rush into its own tests. Israel hasn’t carried out any nuclear tests. Is its nuclear arsenal any less effective because of this? What, if exercising better judgment – admittedly, a tall order – we hadn’t tested in May 1998. Would our bombs have melted or just disappeared? And would Indian tanks have invaded Pakistan?
Here we are bedevilled by the wages of terrorism and a falling economy and yet we speak the language of Prussia at the height of its military power.
And now Mullen’s congressional testimony and some tough talk by the US secretary of defence Leon Panetta have thrown us into a panic in 2011. The corps commanders, forsaking their beloved golf, meet on a Sunday and the good and the patriotic get together for the Pakistani variant of that all-time farce called the APC.
Philip, Alexander the Great’s father, held out this threat to Sparta: “If I enter Laconia (Sparta’s other name), you shall be exterminated.” The reply was a single word, “If”. It’s too much to hope that Pakistan can emulate such brevity but at least our response to real or imagined challenges could be less windy and extended than they often tend to be.
Why should the Americans attack us when a few statements can so thoroughly unnerve us? We are already talking again – the Americans and us – and let no one say that American pressure, calculated or fortuitous, hasn’t worked. The corps commanders hurriedly called to meet and the pantomime of the APC are reminders less of a nation united than a nation easily jolted.
But more than semantics and the right tools of verbiage we have to put a rein on our strategic theories. The threat to us is from within, from the cumulative consequences of past follies. India is an elephant. Living cheek-by-jowl with an elephant is always a problem. But can we please get out of the calculus of India posing some kind of an existential threat to us? From the realm of dreams and fantasies, and imagined threats, isn’t it time we stepped into the real world?

Working The Levers Of Patriotism By Ayaz Amir

Thank you indeed, Admiral Mullen, because you have allowed all the jingoists to crawl out of the woodwork and beat war drums. The delusional framework is so easy to adopt that almost everyone – even the ones that should know better, like old foreign-policy hands – are getting carried away.
The simple fact is that nations cannot afford to take leave of reality. Whatever the public posturing, a cold analysis of our strengths and weaknesses must prevail in the inner citadels of power. While no one is advocating completely giving in to coercion, national interest dictates a measured response.
The problem with the media onslaught and even the APC is – and this is being written before its deliberations – that it raises expectations that are not easily fulfilled. The previous joint session of parliament and APC resolutions were never implemented because they could not be.
Shooting down drones is not as simple as it sounds because it has repercussions that may be difficult, if not impossible, to handle. This is being said ignoring the complicity of the Pakistani state in these strikes, considering that a Pakistani general serving in the tribal areas virtually welcomed them.
Even if we are genuinely angered, and in some cases we are, the expectation that our air force would go and knock the drones down is – using the D word again – delusional. So whatever comes out of the APC would demonstrate for the domestic media that the nation is together but would fool no one. Those dealing with us realise full well what the fate was of other such resolutions.
It is true that all this heat has been generated by foolish choice of words by Admiral Mullen and he is being gently reprimanded by the White House. But it would be again naive to read too much into this. This is not backtracking, as some are claiming, with the US frightened of our national resolve. It is the same old game of carrot and stick or one step back, two steps forward.
The US is indeed stuck in Afghanistan and needs a scapegoat for its failures. Pakistan does fit the bill. This is the fallback option for a worst-case scenario. But it would be wrong to believe that victory or defeat will be declared by the US in Afghanistan come 2014. This war will go on with less or more forces beyond that and Pakistan’s negative or positive relevance will continue.
It is therefore important for us to craft our policies regarding Afghanistan for a longer timeframe, not just three years. The US is likely to be a virtual neighbour for a decade or more. Its force levels may be reduced, but since it is seeking permanent Afghan bases, its air and ground capability in the country will remain. And so will its interest of a relationship with Pakistan.
This is both an opportunity and a threat. Over the last sixty-odd years we have used our strategic relevance as an opportunity to build our military strength, get aid and assistance and further our regional goals. This has not been without cost, particularly the partnership in the war against the Soviets.
But we have persisted with the relationship because in the larger analysis we considered it more positive than negative. The trouble this time around is that the engagement by the US is not from a distance, which allowed temporary differences to be overcome. Now, incongruity in goals directly impact US presence in Afghanistan.
A disagreement about objectives this time around has thus far greater import and its repercussions are also grave. The war of words has the possibility of becoming a prelude to something more serious if in another incident, like the US embassy attack or a truck bomb at one of its bases Americans in large numbers are killed.
In such an eventuality, and the likelihood of it happening is certain, Pakistan would protest in the words of PM Gilani that it cannot be held responsible for the security of American troops in Afghanistan. The problem is that, just as we have an angry public opinion to cater to, so do the Americans.
Particularly in the election year, no American president can appear to be weak. So some form of response cannot be ruled out. What should be of particular concern is that the narrative of Pakistan being a rogue state has already been crafted. This is a necessary prelude to any kind of modern warfare.
So will another attack and large-scale American casualties in Afghanistan lead to a more robust military response against Pakistan? It cannot be ruled out, as stated by an influential American senator, Lindsay Graham. But even if it does not come to that, the levers available to the US to squeeze Pakistan are many.
A number of analysts and even political leaders are arguing that suspension of American aid would be a good thing for the country. That is true, because it may force us to take the necessary steps to increase our domestic revenues that hover around 9 percent of the GDP. But how will we react to total suspension of multilateral aid, a trade embargo or suspension of remittances from the US?
These are not insurmountable challenges if the nation is united and ready for sacrifices, or if we reinvent ourselves, but can we? Also, we need to be careful when we think that China will rescue us. It is a great friend of Pakistan but let us not delude ourselves. It has a trillion or more dollars invested in American bonds and the US remains its largest trading partner.
More than that, China has its own concerns regarding terror incidents in Xinjiang that it believes are the handiwork of people trained in Pakistani tribal areas. Some observers have speculated that the recent visit of the Chinese intelligence chief was more concerned with this matter than anything relating to “higher than Himalayas, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey,” etc., etc., kind of tripe that we are so fond of dishing out.
So let us not allow the jingoists to take over the discourse on Pakistan’s relations with the US, or indeed the West. People of this ilk have let us down again and again, in the 1965 and 1971 wars, and then again in the Kargil conflict. We need to asses our strengths and weaknesses carefully and then proceed.
Lastly, I would again say that why can’t we begin to implement the principle that we will not allow any armed group to use our soil to launch attacks on foreign soil, be it Afghanistan, India or other parts of the world? We may not be able to implement it completely because of this or that reason, but at least the world will not accuse of us complicity.
Our greatest failing may well be our lack of ability to look within.

We Need Wisdom, Not Emotional Rants By Shafqat Mahmood

It was a day that changed the world. Pakistan was deeply affected by the event that took place 10 years ago today. Many in Pakistan believe that we might have been better off if we had not complied with the United Nations resolutions. I am afraid these critics have little or no knowledge of history and on ground facts as they existed then. It may be instructive to revisit the events and the rationale behind our decision to comply with UN resolutions passed in the wake of that most traumatic event.
On another fateful day, nearly two years earlier, my military secretary had whispered into my ear that the pilot of my flight wanted me in the cockpit; that information had led to the hijacking crisis. On this day too, he came up to me during an important meeting with the Karachi corps commander and whispered that an aircraft had crashed into one of the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. As we watched in horror the second plane crashing into the second tower, I knew that the world as we knew it would change and I mentally braced myself for what I knew would be a make-or-break period in our history.
Smoke from the burning aircraft fuel and the dust and debris from the largest building in the world made the scene look like a nuclear explosion. A multitude of thoughts raced through my mind. The world’s most powerful country had been attacked on its own soil, with its own aircraft used as missiles. This was a great tragedy and a great blow to the ego of the superpower. America was sure to react violently, like a wounded bear. If the perpetrator turned out to be Al-Qaeda, then that wounded bear would come charging straight at us.
Sure enough, the next morning the call came. My friend Gen Colin Powell was absolutely candid: “You are either with us or against us.” This was a blatant ultimatum. But forewarned is forearmed, and I was ready for this important call. Contrary to some published reports, that conversation did not go into specifics. I told him that we were with the United States against terrorism, having suffered from it for years, and would fight along with his country against it. I had time to think through exactly what might happen next. It was also communicated to me that “if Pakistan was against the United States then it should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age.”
I would also like to clear the notion that we accepted all the demands put forward by the US. We did not.
I analysed the situation and took stock of the potential realities. I made a dispassionate analysis of our options, weighing the pros and cons. My complete focus was on ensuring that Pakistan was not at the wrong end of a long and bloody reprisal, and to try and steer it through that most turbulent period with as little damage as possible. I also wanted to do the right thing.
What options did the US have to attack Afghanistan? It wasn’t possible from the north, through Russia and the Central Asian Republics. Nor from the west, through Iran. The only viable direction was from the east, through Pakistan. If we did not agree, India was ready to afford all support.
A US-India nexus would obviously have to trample Pakistan to reach Afghanistan. Our airspace and land would have been violated. Should we then have pitched our forces, especially the Pakistan Air Force, against the combined might of the US and Indian forces? India would have been delighted with such a response from us. This would surely have been a foolhardy, rash and most unwise decision. Our strategic interests – our nuclear capability and the Kashmir cause – would have been irreparably compromised. Indeed, we might have put our very territorial integrity at risk.
The economic consequences of confronting the United States and the entire West would also have been devastating. Pakistan’s major exports and imports and investments are linked to the United States and the European Union. Our textiles – 60 percent of our export earnings – go to the West. Any sanction on these would have crippled our industry and choked our economy.
China, our great friend, also has serious apprehensions about Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The upsurge of religious extremism emboldening the East Turkestan Islamic Movement in China is due to events in Afghanistan and the tribal agencies of Pakistan. China would certainly not be too happy if Pakistan sided with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Even the Islamic Ummah had no sympathy for the Taliban regime. Turkey and Iran were certainly against the Taliban. The UAE and Saudi Arabia – the only two countries other than Pakistan that had recognised the Taliban regime – had become so disenchanted with the Taliban that they had closed their missions in Kabul.
This is how I analysed the losses and harms we would suffer if we took an anti-US stand. At the same time, I was obviously not unmindful of the socio-economic and military gains that would accrue to my country from an alliance with the West.
On Sept 13, 2001, the US ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlain, brought me a set of seven demands. These demands had also been communicated to our foreign office.
1. Stop Al-Qaeda operatives at your borders, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and end all logistical support for Bin Laden.
2. Provide the United States with blanket overflight and landing rights to conduct all necessary military and intelligence operations.
3. Provide territorial access to the United States and allied military intelligence as needed and other personnel to conduct all necessary operations against the perpetrators of terrorism and those that harbour them, including the use of Pakistan’s naval ports, air bases and strategic locations on borders.
4. Provide the United States immediately with intelligence, immigration information and databases and internal security information to help prevent and respond to terrorist acts perpetrated against the United States, and its friends and allies.
5. Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts of Sept 11 and any other terrorist acts against the United States and its friends and allies and curb all domestic expressions of support (for terrorism) against the United States, its friends and its allies.
6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and any other items and recruits, including volunteers en route to Afghanistan, who can be used in a military offensive capacity or to abet a terrorist threat.
7. Should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan and should Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to harbour him and his network, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban government, end support for the Taliban and assist the United States in the aforementioned ways to destroy Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network.
Some of these demands, such as “curb all domestic expressions of support (for terrorism) against the United States, its friends, and its allies,” were ludicrous. How could my government suppress public debate when I had been trying to encourage freedom of expression?
I also thought that asking us to break off diplomatic relations with Afghanistan was neither realistic nor in our interest. The United States too would need us to have access to Afghanistan, at least till the Taliban fell. Also, such decisions are the internal affair of a country and cannot be dictated by anyone. We had no problem with curbing terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. In fact, we had been itching to do so even before the United States became its victim.
Thus, we had problems only with demands two and three. How could we allow the United States “blanket overflight and landing rights” without jeopardising our strategic assets? I offered only a narrow flight corridor that was far from all sensitive areas. Neither could we give the United States “use of Pakistan’s naval ports, air bases, and strategic locations on borders.” We refused to give any naval port or fighter-aircraft bases. We allowed the United States only two bases – Shamsi in Balochistan and Jacobabad in Sindh – and only for logistics and aircraft recovery. No attack could be launched from there. We gave no “blanket permission” for anything.
The rest of the demands we could live with.
I took it to the cabinet. I met with a cross-section of society. Between Sept 18 and Oct 3, I met intellectuals, top editors, leading columnists, academics, tribal chiefs, students and labour union leaders. I also met with a delegation from China and discussed the decision with them. Then I went to army garrisons all over the country and talked to the soldiers. I thus developed a broad consensus on my decision.
I am happy that the US government accepted our counter-proposal without any fuss. I am shocked at the aspersion being cast on me: that I readily accepted all preconditions of the United States during the telephone call from Colin Powell.
I have laid down the rationale of my decision in all its details. Even with the benefit of hindsight, I do not regret it. It was the correct decision and very much in the interest of Pakistan.
As head of state, I faced many challenges and had to take many difficult decisions. This was easily the most difficult one. I am convinced that it was the right decision and I am confident the majority of my countrymen also think so. I can say, hand on heart, that in all matters I always kept the interest of Pakistan above all else. My motto is, has been, and, Inshallah, always will be “Pakistan First.”
The writer is a former chief of the army staff and president of Pakistan.

I Stand By My Decision By Pervez Musharraf

The televangelists, holy entertainers and the know-it-all jugglers of news and views are having a field day in Pakistan. What else would sell better than the war rhetoric in the living rooms of the middleclass urban and semi-urban populations? That is where the ratings for programmes and talk shows are gathered from. These are the people who use the fast-moving consumer goods, more or less the only manufacturing left in the country, and enjoy the different packages offered by cell phone companies. The commercials of these products make it possible for the private television channels to continue programming.
Therefore, profit-making has to be quick, sharp and maximum. The programming has to suit the palate of the most conservative political class in Pakistan. Sorry. Not conservative, confused and conservative. Mainstream electronic media is not capable of – or not interested at all in – bringing both knowledge and sanity to its audience by apprising them of the challenges Pakistan will face if there is an abrupt severance of relationship between the two allies in the war on terror. Therefore, for a change, the country we wish to fight and destroy this time around is not India but the United States of America.
When those running different institutions of the state of Pakistan are undoubtedly upset with the Americans, they want de-escalation in tensions, continuation of a constructive dialogue and a negotiated settlement. The corps commanders had no choice but to show restraint when they met and so did the prime minister and his cabinet members. The All Parties’ Conference is underway at the time of writing this piece and it is an important initiative in terms of taking all political forces on board.
The prime minister in his opening remarks mentioned the willingness of the government to engage with the Americans and resolve any outstanding issues, although he was firm and forceful at the same time. This is because those running the affairs of the state, whatever their competence level may be, fully realise where the country stands in these difficult times, economically, politically and militarily.
But our media is playing a dangerous game by whipping up emotions of an already confused and conservative populace. Showing war footage from 1965 and 1971, playing war anthems, even if that happened once or twice, and airing provocative programmes where war-mongers are invited to speak or are taken on the phone as experts is strengthening a particular mindset. This mindset is suicidal, bigoted and jingoistic. It has landed us into trouble in the past, brought embarrassment internationally in the present and making us implode as a country and society in not too distant future.
Let us be honest to ourselves. Even progressive Americans cannot hold a brief for the foreign policy pursued by the Americans since the Second World War, leave alone someone coming from the third world. But in the case of Pakistan, who decided to side with the Americans and why since the times of Seato and Cento in Gen Ayub’s era? Who decided to make Pakistan into the frontline state in America’s war against the Soviets under Gen Zia? Who decided to become the closest non-Nato ally of the Americans under Gen Musharraf? Who has created the reliance on American military aid, the need for American development aid and dependence on international financial institutions dominated by the Americans? Who do we trade with the most? Why do half of us wish our children to study in the US and the rest wish to emigrate themselves? What’s gone wrong now then? I rest my case.

War Euphoria By Harris Khalique

IT is not much of an exaggeration to state that Pakistan has always been an aid-dependent country. Estimates suggest that the gross disbursement of overseas development assistance to Pakistan from 1960 to 2002 (in 2001 prices) was $73.1bn, including bilateral and multilateral sources.

Almost 30 per cent of this official development assistance came in the form of bilateral aid from the US, the largest single bilateral donor by far. Assistance of this magnitude was made possible by the fact that Pakistan’s leadership, especially its military leadership, clearly aligned itself with the US during the Cold War.

US aid to Pakistan was vital during the 1960s. It helped play a significant part in numerous development projects, food support and humanitarian assistance through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other mechanisms. By 1964, overall aid and assistance to Pakistan was around five per cent of its GDP and was critical in spurring Pakistani industrialisation and development. Not only was aid vital in the 1960s, it was also focused on civilian economic assistance.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 resulted in increased US development and military assistance as Pakistan became a frontline state in the war against Soviet occupation. Large and undisclosed amounts of money and arms were channelled to the Mujahideen fighting the Red Army in Afghanistan through Pakistan’s military and its clandestine agencies, particularly the ISI. While this ‘aid’ was not meant directly for Pakistan’s military, there is ample evidence that significant funds meant for the Afghan Mujahideen were pocketed by Pakistani officers.

US assistance between 1971-2001 did not put Pakistan on a path to self-sustaining growth, nor did it bring about any real value in terms of America’s own Cold War objectives. The expulsion of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan with strategic help from Pakistan was a major gain for Washington, but the Afghan campaign also ended up strengthening the praetorian state in Pakistan while doing little to aid its people. After September 2001, the nature of the US aid to Pakistan relationship changed primarily to purchasing Pakistan’s cooperation in counterterrorism. In 2002-10 (and not including commitments such as the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009), the US gave Pakistan almost $19bn, or more than $2bn on average each year, with twice as much allocated in 2010 ($3.6bn) than in 2007. During 2002-08, only 10 per cent of this money was meant for Pakistani development, and as much as 75 per cent of the money was explicitly for military purposes. In more recent years, the share of economic-related aid has risen, but it is still less than half. It is important to state, that the primary purpose of aid to Pakistan has been counterterrorism, not economic support.

Since 2008, there has been a rethinking in the nature of US assistance to Pakistan. The first major step was the promulgation of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, which commits $7.5bn in non-military aid to Pakistan over five years. However, it is still not clear when and how the legislation will actually start delivering aid to Pakistan. The Christian Science Monitor reported that only $285m of this money had been spent by May 2011.

After a decade of engagement and assistance between the US and Pakistan, what emerges from both countries’ perspective is that post-9/11 US aid has been focused mainly on carrying out counterterrorism operations, not helping the Pakistani people or the economy, or building democracy. This assistance has not achieved the counterterrorism objectives of the US or Pakistan, even acknowledging that the objectives have been inadequately defined. It has had the effect, however, of strengthening the praetorian state further — thus reinforcing the very weaknesses of Pakistan’s democracy that the Americans decry.

The question asked in Islamabad, as well as in Washington, as to what benefits US aid brings to Pakistan, is being answered as follows. In Washington, the question being asked post-Bin Laden is: what is or has the US received in return for the $20bn aid given to Pakistan over the last decade? And the answer seems to be ‘not very much’. In Islamabad, the question being asked by politicians and civil society members is similar: what has US aid delivered for the people of Pakistan? The answer again is ‘not very much, except that the military has benefited the most’.

Both Pakistan and the US have reason to be disappointed with the results of American aid. Though the US hoped that this assistance would encourage Pakistan’s army to help in the war on terrorism in the border regions of Pakistan, there has been no real evidence that the Pakistani army has been on the same page as the US administration in this regard, or that the government and military feel as strongly about Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban as does the US administration.

The Pakistani military has been the main beneficiary of aid from the US, exploiting the pathology of too big and too important to fail. Since military aid has been two or three times as large as economic aid, the US government has strengthened the hand of the military in Pakistan’s political economy, sidestepping the elected civilian government because there has been more trust, unfounded, no doubt, in the ability of the Pakistani military. There is an urgent need to shift the relationship away from a myopic focus on the military towards a more productive use of aid. Such a shift might just strengthen democracy in Pakistan as well.

Source: Dawn News

Who Benefits From US Aid? By S. Akbar Zaidi

So then, who saw the photograph in the Wall Street Journal of this last Wednesday that showed Pakistanis in some bazaar, shouting hate slogans against the United States? If you didn’t, do see it on the Internet, reader: there are about 15 or 20 raggedy people, in the forefront a bearded gentleman with his face contorted with what he expects us to believe is rage. It seems nothing of the kind because several ‘protesters’ in the background are actually smirking.

The placards they are holding and quite obviously shoving into the face of the cameraman bear the legends: ‘Hate Amrica’; ‘Crush Amrica’ which seem, quite obviously, the handiwork of the ‘Ghairat Brigades’ supported by the hard-right jingoist media, on the lines of the obviously contrived ‘We love ISI’ demo in Islamabad in the aftermath of Bin Laden’s killing.

The second of the placards (Crush Amrica) took me straight back 41 years to the ‘Crush India’ campaign launched by the Pakistani Deep State hand-in-glove with an Urdu daily out of Lahore. Most of my readers (for, reading the spirited comments at the end of news stories and op-eds it seems to me that this newspaper of record is the preferred newspaper of the young) may not even know of THAT campaign, the result of which, incidentally, was the dismemberment of Pakistan with one-half of the country and the larger part of the population becoming an independent Bangladesh.

Remember, that at the time we were trying to crush impoverished, but much larger than ourselves, India, which was then almost equivalent to us in the sophistication of weaponry. NOW we are calling for the crushing of ‘Amrica’, the only super-power (other than us, of course!) on earth, and on whom OUR military machine (aka the Deep State) depends for the more sophisticated of its weapons systems; cash; moral support; you name it. And on which it strikes attitudes and growls at the rest of the world.

As an aside, a blogger on one of the many, many blogs and threads and sites and whatever they are called, a Jihadi who also wants to ‘crush’ Amrika, challenged all and sundry to tell him exactly how America had come to the aid of Pakistan! Well, I only know what I saw when I joined the army in 1965 (no, I was not a Nur Jahania i.e., one of those who joined the short courses that came in after the 1965 war with India).

While in the Pakistan military Academy (PMA, the much written-about academy near which the terrorist Bin Laden was killed) we were trained on the Rifle No.4 Mk 1, a bolt-action, British-era small arm and the .303 light machine gun (LMG). When we got to our units in May of 1966 we were issued the American semi-automatic .30 M-1 rifle and the .30 Browning automatic rifle (BAR) light machine gun. As also the .30 heavy machine gun. These was also Korean war surplus weaponry which had been diverted to Pakistan after the end of that conflict.

We also had the great M38 Willys Jeep which we called ‘Little Willy’, and which was a little workhorse with a heart as big as an elephant — later upgraded to the M-38 A-1 (by the Americans didn’t you know)? These Jeeps went everywhere, did everything, and I remember so well driving the M38 through the Tavi River, its exhaust in two feet of water; to say nothing of the wonderful ¾ ton Dodge and the 2-1/2 ton Cargo, let alone the Patton tanks and the F-86s and the F-104s and then the C-130s and the F-16s and the Orion-P3Cs (all of which were destroyed by five al Qaeda operatives not too long ago, shame on us); and battle-ships; and cruisers; and mine-sweepers. We ought to be ashamed of ourselves for forgetting history.

It is not my intention to be an apologist for America: I have been a trenchant critic of its long-standing preference for military dictators who did its bidding, from Ayub Khan who actually agreed to change the TO and E (the Top Secret Tables of Organisation and Equipment) of the Pakistan Army just to get more aid from the Americans, to the tyrant Zia, to the ill-meaning Musharraf. I am merely putting on record the largesse that America has shown to our tin-hats over the years which they are now (seemingly, only) not recognising to embellish their so-called ‘nationalism’.

This is dishonesty and hypocrisy of the worst order, and is obviously being pursued to divert people’s attention from their own failings and most recent set-backs (do we have to repeat the names ‘Abbottabad’ and ‘Mehran’?) that have shown them to be incompetent and inept. This managed hysteria and jingoism also helps put other of their problems out of sight. Such as the disappeared people, and Saleem Shahzad’s brutal and cruel murder.

By the way, the ISI had announced through one of its unnamed and mysterious ‘media managers’ that it would leave ‘no stone unturned’ to find Saleem’s murderer, a few days after his violent death, when the spoor marks led directly to itself. Well, how many more stones are left to be turned, please sirs? You obviously aren’t all you tout yourselves to be, what, for you have not told us so many months down the line who killed Saleem?

But, coming back to the fake righteous indignation of our Rommels and Guderians, they know better than us just what America means to them and in what close embrace they are with it. The only problem is that America has shown them up to be the double-dealers that they are. And America is right, for which of us Pakistanis did not know that our Deep State was, yes, consorting with exactly the wrong people? And is continuing to, as evidenced by our great ‘Foreign Policy Elites’ trying to get them a seat at the Afghan High Table.

How, pray, are the Taliban and their friends the Haqqanis good for Pakistan? Their record is uniformly bad.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 30^th, 2011.

Hate Amrica; Crush Amrika By Kamran Shafi

Imran Khan has always confronted the proverbial question ‘will he make it?’ in whatever he has set out to do. That was the question when his team was losing in the earlier stages of the World Cup of 1992, but he was the proud recipient of the coveted trophy at the concluding ceremony. The same was the haunting question when he launched “Imran’s Tigers” to build a cancer hospital in memory of his mother. He succeeded in building the Shaukat Khanum Memorial Hospital — one of the most acclaimed institutions known for its professional expertise and its humanitarian consideration, as it treats more than 75 per cent of its patients free of cost. This question again haunted him when he announced plans to build a university in one of the most backward areas of the country. The university, an affiliate of the UK-based University of Bradford, is there for all to see in Mianwali, as it disseminates quality education in a variety of disciplines.

George Fulton, in his article of September 22 titled “Yes we Khan”, wrote that Imran’s persona and the party were interchangeable and this springs from the preconceived notion of seeing only the corrupt as political leaders. One concedes that the PTI has none of this breed, and indeed will never have. But Mr Fulton fails to see the many bright faces that adorn the party. They may not be the likes of those who have traditionally indulged in denuding this country of its countless riches and enormous potential. They are professionals who all have earned a name for their capabilities and capacities to deliver.

Mr Fulton erroneously calls Imran’s idealism as ‘naivety’. This is the approach that has worked and delivered for him in the most trying of circumstances. And why should it not deliver now? Just because his battle is now in the realm of politics, where Imran is confronted with a pack of vultures and opportunists who see him as a potent threat to their fiefdom? Should he change course just to get into power and end up doing nothing — like all the political entities have done before him? What then would be the difference between him and the corrupt lot that he opposes so vehemently and correctly? If Mr Fulton looks at his appraisal once more to understand the deepset malaise that afflicts Pakistan, he too would come to the conclusion that if one is to bring genuine change here compromise with criminals and marauders is not the way.

At this critical juncture of its history, Pakistan needs an honest and incorruptible leader who would be able to lead by example. A corrupt leader would lead only by way of corruption. We have a string of them here — leaders with billions stashed away paying a miserly Rs 5,000 as annual income tax, or nothing at all. Pakistan is reeling under the debris of such corruption bequeathed upon it by an endless stream of inept rulers. Do we want to continue heaping humiliation upon the country and its people?

Because of the lack of credibility of successive leaderships that have ruled Pakistan, it has lost face internationally. Its word is not trusted and its intentions doubted. To correct that, Pakistan must have a leadership that would spell confidence among the international community and promote the self-respect of the poor people of the country.

It is with his credibility that he would be able to gel this nation into a powerful tool to fight and defeat the forces of obscurantism. He is a person who believes in moving forward and has no skeletons in the cupboard to draw him back. His growing popularity has cast a spell of doom on all his opponents who are lined up outside his door seeking an alliance or a ‘deal’. Imran says no not because he is proud, or naïve, but because he has taken upon himself a challenge that would be insurmountable if he were to follow a policy of compromise. He is the harbinger of change that the people of this country have waited for.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 30^th, 2011.

In Defence Of Imran Khan By Raoof Hasan

You might not know there is a vogue for autobiographies by comedians. Indeed, you might not know Shoaib Akhtar as a comedian but, almost by accident, he has made the world laugh. Shoaib is a rare cricketer from his joint hyperextensions to his neuronal synapses. His career has been a journey of scandal interrupted by infrequent displays of brilliance. He is a captivating character on the field of play and an infuriating personality off it. He might even have been great had the fates and his own failings not wrecked his career trajectory.

Perhaps that is the fiercest motivation behind his autobiography, ‘Controversially Yours’? A rare man damns his own deeds; far more palatable to damn the deeds of others. Shoaib prefers j’accuse to mea culpa.

Shoaib has a point. A more professional cricket board and better team leadership might have guided him more wisely through the scandals that besieged him. The throwing controversy and how it was handled by international umpires and the ICC was not his fault, but much else was. When a man of Bob Woolmer’s consummate loyalty and patience despairs of you, you’d be sensible to look inwards for the source of your problems.

Shoaib hasn’t looked inwards, he has struck out against the world safe in the knowledge that his cricketing career is over. That is his prerogative, to end on a sour note with former teammates and adversaries. If he doesn’t rate Sachin Tendulkar and Rahul Dravid higher than Ricky Ponting or Viv Richards then fair enough, plenty of other cricketers would agree with him. Imran Khan, Shoaib’s hero, whose more considered autobiography has just been released doesn’t think Tendulkar comes close to Richards either.

Did Sachin fear Shoaib? Who knows? It was only Pakistan’s madcap fast bowler who stared into the maestro’s eyes in the heat of battle. A personal opinion requires neither reprimand nor apology, as reportedly demanded by the BCCI.

Of the rest, nothing seems particularly new, a rerun of old rivalries, intrigues, and badmashies. Capturing the world according to Shoaib is a worthy effort. He is a difficult man to pin down in a verbal joust. Ask him about Sachin and he’ll tell you about Brian Lara. He will mumble incoherently in English and end with no greater clarity in Urdu. He will use a torrent of words — many in common usage, some of his own invention — in an unpredictable order and manage to say nothing at all.

Shoaib remains an entertainer, a legend in his mind’s eye—simply the best, better than the rest. He deserves respect for some of the incredible spells he produced during a tarnished career. He deserves sympathy for the way his cricket board and a succession of captains found it impossible to mentor him. But his career was left unfulfilled by dint of his own misdemeanours as much as, if not more than, by the malice of his enemies.

One of the fascinations of human existence is that we might all experience the same events but we will interpret them in our own, possibly very different ways. That is the power of autobiography. It is one view, a chance at explaining how you saw it without fear or contrition, and Shoaib saw that the world was against him. He also saw an opportunity to grab the limelight, to diss and tell.

In that moment of mad self-promotion, a moment that the media was happy to help sensationalise, the story of Shoaib Akhtar managed to overshadow the greater history of Imran Khan’s life in cricket and politics, and the lesser landmark of Waqar Younis coaching Pakistan to a whitewash over Zimbabwe in his farewell series. Unfortunately, Shoaib’s achievements take far fewer words to catalogue than his love of controversy. In autobiographies, there is usually no smoke without fire but the heat you feel from the blaze depends on how the central character has read the smoke signals. Shoaib saw an inferno. The marketing team for his publishing house did the rest.

Every man, Shoaib Akhtar included, has a right to make a fool of himself, especially in his autobiography.

Source : Cricinfo.com

Shoaib feels the heat of his own inferno By Kamran Abbasi

At 73, it’s time he heads the PVCB (Pakistan Veterans’ Cricket Board) instead of the PCB.
Many have come and gone trying to present reasons for him to be sacked, but to no avail. I would also like to enter and ebb in the endless list of those who believe Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) Chairman Ijaz Butt should resign or be sacked.

Below are 10 reasons that I believe are enough for Mr Butt to vacate his post:

1. At 73, it’s time Mr Butt heads the PVCB (Pakistan Veterans’ Cricket Board) instead of the PCB. The manager of the PVC team can still be his long time friend from Hoshiarpur, Intikhab Alam who himself is 70 years of age.

2. The next cricket world cup isn’t scheduled to take place in Pakistan, so we don’t actually need someone (Ijaz Butt) to give it away, for at least four more years.

3. Since Shahid Afridi announced his retirement, there are no more superstars left in the Pakistan team for the PCB chief to humiliate.

4. Butt needs to realise that Mr Ahmed Mukhtar has other relatives too, who he needs to please. He should make way for them.

5. There are no more accolades lefts for him to achieve. U-turns on roads have already been renamed. They are now called ‘Ijaz Butts.’

6. It’ll be some time till the next Akmal grows old enough to join the Pakistan team so there won’t be anyone for Butt to pamper.

7. No cricketer in the present bunch is interested in becoming an ‘episodic’ captain.

8. A proposed amendment to the International Cricket Council’s (ICC) constitution (if approved) would allow the governing body to suspend a member in case of government interference in the running of a national cricket board (I think they’re talking about you Mr Butt. I suggest you take the hint.)

9. The selection committee has become rather rusty. It’s about time we let it select teams.

10. The PCB head’s chair has finally said, “You resign, or else I will!”

10 Reasons Why Ijaz Butt Should Quit

The defence for Mumtaz Qadri, the self-confessed murderer of slain Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer, has adopted a simple strategy to save the remorseless killer. Taseer’s statements were “unbecoming of a Muslim” and therefore Qadri, a devout Muslim, could not control his emotions and resorted to an instantaneous act. For good measure, the court hearing the case was also told that Taseer’s statements could have inflamed the passions of any Muslim which means that even if Qadri had not committed this heroic act, someone else would have.

So, Qadri’s lawyers are presenting his act as sudden provocation, automatism in legal terms, meant as a defence by negating the existence of actus reus, the actual act of committing a crime. This is supplemented by referring to religion, religious teachings and the sanctity of the Prophet (PBUH) not just to ground the automatism plea but to appeal to the court’s own conscience and piety.

Implied in this is also a veiled threat that some issues stand above and beyond the law and institutional hierarchy and must be treated on a touchstone other than that which placed Taseer in a position of authority. Ironically, this effect is to be achieved by referring to Taseer’s alleged conduct as violative of the blasphemy law and the inability — or unwillingness — of the state to proceed against him which, in this case, forced Qadri to act on his own. The inevitability of Taseer’s murder is argued by the defence as “if Qadri had not killed him, someone else would have”.

It should be clear that Qadri’s lawyers are cleverly relying on chunks of law even as their underlying argument is grounded in the justification of the act as being religious and supra-legal and therefore not to be judged on the basis of legalities.

The problem with this defence is not just its logical inconsistency but also the fact that Qadri’s act, from what we know, does not fall under the automatism plea. He murdered Taseer in cold blood and with meticulous planning. He was waiting for an opportunity and when he found it, he unleashed his fire power on a defenceless, unsuspecting man.

The questions, therefore, do not relate to provocation. Even if we factor out common legalities, we are left with at least two questions: what does the tradition say about someone killing a person he is entrusted to protect and do so through deception, which is what Qadri did? Two, is it acceptable defence under Islamic law if someone says that he executed another person because the latter had done something un-Islamic and the state didn’t act, forcing him to take the law into his own hands?

My queries to some scholars tell me that the tradition is clear on both counts. For instance, most exegetes believe that the Holy Quran (8:72) points out that jihad, even against those who were opposing the Prophet (pbuh) and oppressing Muslims, was not permitted in violation of a treaty. In effect they agree that a promise or trust must be honoured. Qadri broke the trust through deception.

Similarly, taking the law into one’s own hand is strictly prohibited by all mainstream Sunni jurists (for example, Qazi Abu Bakr Jassas in his Ahkam al-Quran points out that jihad or implementinghadd cannot be permitted without the authority of the ruler, in modern times the state, not the clerics and certainly not by a semi-literate policeman.

On both counts the exegetes say the crime committed by Qadri may be punishable by death. This makes sense because if it is accepted that the organising principle under Islam is the state then it cannot be argued that because the state did not act an individual has the right to do so. One doesn’t need to be a logician to see the chaos such an argument would unleash on a collection of people. In fact, going by what we are witnessing, one doesn’t require conceptual finesse to understand it. There is enough empirical evidence for even a village idiot to appreciate the consequences of such an approach.

But let’s assume for the sake of the argument that Taseer had crossed a line. Exegetes agree that he would still have the luxury of a trial and a defence. Let’s now assume that Qadri is right in saying that the state did not act against Taseer. He, like any other citizen of this country, could have taken the issue to the court. But he did not because he wanted to emerge a hero and in this country that means committing a spectacular act of violence in the name of Islam. He is already a hero, a murderer raised to the level of a saint that is even respected by the jail staff.

Imagine if he is let off.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 29^th, 2011.

Mumtaz Qadri’s Bogus Defence By Ejaz Haider

A SERIES of atrocities recently committed against members of minority communities shows that the canker of sectarian violence is posing for Pakistan a much greater threat than is generally realised, especially by the establishment.

The killing of 29 Shia pilgrims near Mastung set some kind of a record in bestiality; the innocent travellers were forced to alight from their bus, lined up and cut down in cold blood. That this was no isolated act by some mentally deranged gangsters was soon confirmed when a similar event, though on a smaller scale, was reported from Quetta and an extremist organisation, supposedly banned by the government, accepted responsibility for both outrages.

These incidents should be seen in the context of the killing and harassment of the Hazara community in Quetta, that have been going on for years, and the excesses being committed against the Shias in Kurram Agency.

Three conclusions are obvious. First, the size of the population threatened by the wave of sectarian violence has increased by a wide margin. Secondly, the targeted groups are no longer threatened with loss of job or property; their right to life itself is denied. And, thirdly, the addition of minority-bashing to the Al Qaeda’s agenda has greatly enhanced the strength of the forces that are challenging the state of Pakistan in this regard.

Discrimination including violence against communities that are non-Muslim by choice (Hindus, Christians, Sikhs et al) and those put in this bracket against their will (Ahmedis) has been on the increase for several years. That meant about five per cent of the population, or nine million people, were threatened. Even that was not a small number. The addition of the Shias to the people earmarked for extermination should raise the figure of endangered Pakistanis to 15 to 20 per cent of the population — 27 to 36 million people. Does it not put the need to combat sectarianism at the top of the national agenda?

Traditionally, attacks on minorities were limited to demands for their purge from services, denial of promotion or recruitment, exclusion from housing colonies and similar forms of economic and social discrimination. Now the target groups are threatened with physical liquidation. In some cases, the possibility of one escaping death by ‘conversion to Islam’ is not even mentioned. Such threats carry seeds of pogroms that no sane person can possibly contemplate with equanimity.

So long as violence against the Shia community was the work of local hate-preachers employed or aided by some politicians in the Khanewal and Jhang districts any conscientious district official could deal with them. Now there is considerable evidence of organisational link-ups between anti-Shia militants of Punjabi origin and the Sunni extremists in the Al Qaeda-Taliban high command.

The danger of the anti-Shia drive being made into a duty under jihad cannot be ignored. That could increase sectarian prejudices among the government personnel. The religio-political parties that do not oppose militants and inwardly support them are unlikely to protest against Shia killings (as they do not condemn killers of Ahmedis or those who defend the blasphemy accused), leading to a wider acceptability of Shia killings. The government’s ability to deal with violators of the law will surely decline.

The increase in anti-Shia sectarian violence is fuelling intolerance in other areas. The excesses against the Ahmedis are on the increase. Every now and then an Ahmedi is killed for his belief. The intimidation and harassment of an Ahmedi couple who burnt their savings to set up a college in Duniyapur, in Lodhran district of Punjab, continues unabated. The latest is a movement for a complete social boycott of Ahmedis in Pachnand, Chakwal district, that includes expulsion of Ahmedi boys and girls from schools, boycott of Ahmedi shops and refusal to allow them seats on buses. The persecution of a Christian student by unjustly accusing her of blasphemy is just one of the many forms anti-minority mania can take.

Many factors have contributed to the growth of sectarian violence in Pakistan, beginning with flaws in the theory of the state and the various steps taken towards its theocratisation. But one of the main factors has been the state’s failure to deal with the element of criminality in sectarianism. Most of the perpetrators of horrible crimes against the minorities have remained untracked.

Many instances of collusion between sectarian killers and law-enforcement agencies have come to light. Cases against leaders of sectarian gangs have failed because of police reluctance to place evidence against them before the courts. But while failure to arrest sectarian killers can be understood because of difficulties in identifying them, no excuse is available in the case of known instigators of sectarian hatred.

All over the country, bookshops are full of publications that preach hatred against non-Muslims and the various Muslim sects and call for violence. Oral statements are made to the same effect from a variety of forums. Members of minority communities are receiving death threats through letters signed by persons who can be identified by the addresses of their organisations and phone/fax numbers. By declining to proceed against these hate-preachers the state indicts itself of complicity with some of the most despicable criminals in the country.

And this despite the fact that hate-preaching and incitement to sectarian violence have been recognised as crimes for 150 years. Action can be taken under a variety of laws, including the Pakistan Penal Code and Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance. Suppression of sectarian violence and hatred was in fact one of the objectives for which the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 was enacted. It defines an action as terrorism if it “incites hatred and contempt on religious, sectarian or ethnic basis to stir up violence or cause internal disturbance”. One does have serious reservations about this law but if it can be invoked against students (for making modest demands) and lawyers (for demanding the rule of law) its non-application to those who propagate sectarian hatred is a scandal of the first order.

True, violence and discrimination against the minorities is only a part of the mess that has been created in Pakistan by systematic abuse and exploitation of people’s belief. It will take a lot of concerted effort over a long time to restore sanity of thought, but there can be no delay in guaranteeing the minorities the protection of the law.

The point cannot be over-emphasised. If the state of Pakistan cannot afford the protection of law to the Shia, the Ahmedi and any other community, no additional evidence will be required to brand it as a failed state. Indeed, a state that puts five to 20 per cent of its population at the mercy of bloodthirsty goons forfeits its claim to be accepted as a modern state. What is at stake is not only the life and liberty of a Hazara, or an Ahmedi or a Christian citizen; at stake is the survival of the Pakistani nation. Denial of minorities’ rights has always meant that the majority has taken the suicide path.

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