The simple fact is that nations cannot afford to take leave of reality. Whatever the public posturing, a cold analysis of our strengths and weaknesses must prevail in the inner citadels of power. While no one is advocating completely giving in to coercion, national interest dictates a measured response.
The problem with the media onslaught and even the APC is – and this is being written before its deliberations – that it raises expectations that are not easily fulfilled. The previous joint session of parliament and APC resolutions were never implemented because they could not be.
Shooting down drones is not as simple as it sounds because it has repercussions that may be difficult, if not impossible, to handle. This is being said ignoring the complicity of the Pakistani state in these strikes, considering that a Pakistani general serving in the tribal areas virtually welcomed them.
Even if we are genuinely angered, and in some cases we are, the expectation that our air force would go and knock the drones down is – using the D word again – delusional. So whatever comes out of the APC would demonstrate for the domestic media that the nation is together but would fool no one. Those dealing with us realise full well what the fate was of other such resolutions.
It is true that all this heat has been generated by foolish choice of words by Admiral Mullen and he is being gently reprimanded by the White House. But it would be again naive to read too much into this. This is not backtracking, as some are claiming, with the US frightened of our national resolve. It is the same old game of carrot and stick or one step back, two steps forward.
The US is indeed stuck in Afghanistan and needs a scapegoat for its failures. Pakistan does fit the bill. This is the fallback option for a worst-case scenario. But it would be wrong to believe that victory or defeat will be declared by the US in Afghanistan come 2014. This war will go on with less or more forces beyond that and Pakistan’s negative or positive relevance will continue.
It is therefore important for us to craft our policies regarding Afghanistan for a longer timeframe, not just three years. The US is likely to be a virtual neighbour for a decade or more. Its force levels may be reduced, but since it is seeking permanent Afghan bases, its air and ground capability in the country will remain. And so will its interest of a relationship with Pakistan.
This is both an opportunity and a threat. Over the last sixty-odd years we have used our strategic relevance as an opportunity to build our military strength, get aid and assistance and further our regional goals. This has not been without cost, particularly the partnership in the war against the Soviets.
But we have persisted with the relationship because in the larger analysis we considered it more positive than negative. The trouble this time around is that the engagement by the US is not from a distance, which allowed temporary differences to be overcome. Now, incongruity in goals directly impact US presence in Afghanistan.
A disagreement about objectives this time around has thus far greater import and its repercussions are also grave. The war of words has the possibility of becoming a prelude to something more serious if in another incident, like the US embassy attack or a truck bomb at one of its bases Americans in large numbers are killed.
In such an eventuality, and the likelihood of it happening is certain, Pakistan would protest in the words of PM Gilani that it cannot be held responsible for the security of American troops in Afghanistan. The problem is that, just as we have an angry public opinion to cater to, so do the Americans.
Particularly in the election year, no American president can appear to be weak. So some form of response cannot be ruled out. What should be of particular concern is that the narrative of Pakistan being a rogue state has already been crafted. This is a necessary prelude to any kind of modern warfare.
So will another attack and large-scale American casualties in Afghanistan lead to a more robust military response against Pakistan? It cannot be ruled out, as stated by an influential American senator, Lindsay Graham. But even if it does not come to that, the levers available to the US to squeeze Pakistan are many.
A number of analysts and even political leaders are arguing that suspension of American aid would be a good thing for the country. That is true, because it may force us to take the necessary steps to increase our domestic revenues that hover around 9 percent of the GDP. But how will we react to total suspension of multilateral aid, a trade embargo or suspension of remittances from the US?
These are not insurmountable challenges if the nation is united and ready for sacrifices, or if we reinvent ourselves, but can we? Also, we need to be careful when we think that China will rescue us. It is a great friend of Pakistan but let us not delude ourselves. It has a trillion or more dollars invested in American bonds and the US remains its largest trading partner.
More than that, China has its own concerns regarding terror incidents in Xinjiang that it believes are the handiwork of people trained in Pakistani tribal areas. Some observers have speculated that the recent visit of the Chinese intelligence chief was more concerned with this matter than anything relating to “higher than Himalayas, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey,” etc., etc., kind of tripe that we are so fond of dishing out.
So let us not allow the jingoists to take over the discourse on Pakistan’s relations with the US, or indeed the West. People of this ilk have let us down again and again, in the 1965 and 1971 wars, and then again in the Kargil conflict. We need to asses our strengths and weaknesses carefully and then proceed.
Lastly, I would again say that why can’t we begin to implement the principle that we will not allow any armed group to use our soil to launch attacks on foreign soil, be it Afghanistan, India or other parts of the world? We may not be able to implement it completely because of this or that reason, but at least the world will not accuse of us complicity.
Our greatest failing may well be our lack of ability to look within.