Even before Mullen’s comments, US officials had ramped up their warnings that US patience was wearing thin. On Sept 17, US ambassador in Pakistan Cameron Munter spoke of “evidence linking the Haqqani network to the Pakistani government.” This, he said, must stop. On Sept 18, in an unusually long meeting with Hina Rabbani Khar, Hillary Clinton demanded that Pakistan should take action on its own and jointly with the US in fighting the Haqqani network.
Three days later, both Panetta and Mullen adopted a threatening tone when they appeared together at a Pentagon news briefing on Sept 20. Panetta said the US would take “whatever steps are necessary to protect our forces.” That message was conveyed also by new CIA chief Petraeus to Ahmad Shuja Pasha at their meeting the same day in Washington. The next day The Washington Post carried a story, based on briefings by US officials, that the United States had given “what amounts to an ultimatum” to Pakistan to cut ties with the Haqqani group and had warned that the US would “act unilaterally if Pakistan does not comply.”
This crescendo of threats and warnings reached its zenith at the hearing in the Senate Armed Service Committee on Sept 22. The Haqqani network, Mullen told the committee, acted as a “veritable arm” of the ISI and the agency had supported Haqqani operatives in planning and conducting the attacks in Wardak and Kabul. In words that are familiar from the litany of Indian allegations against Pakistan, Mullen said the government of Pakistan, and especially the Pakistani army and the ISI, had chosen “to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy” and were “exporting violence.” In his prepared statement placed on the record of the committee, Mullen warned that the support given by Pakistan to the Haqqani group might warrant international sanctions.
Given the sharp allegations from US officials and the incendiary language used by Mullen before the committee, it is not surprising that some American legislators and a section of the US media virtually went on the rampage against Pakistan, accusing it of duplicity and deception, and of endangering the lives of US soldiers battling heroically for the security of their homeland.
Several members of the Congress have demanded cuts in military and economic aid. The New York Times has called for the pressure on Pakistan to be ratcheted up and warned darkly that the Americans are going to have to go after the Haqqanis whenever and wherever they can. One Western political analyst wrote that now that the US has the Pakistan army very firmly in its sights and the endgame is not in Afghanistan but in Pakistan.
Those who have been entertaining this hope are in for a disappointment. One unintended consequence of the pressure exerted by the US has been that it has angered public opinion in Pakistan, making it politically more difficult for the Pakistani government to give in to Washington’s demands. Gilani’s decision to call an all-parties conference was a smart political move. But Zardari’s silence in this crisis speaks volumes for his priorities.
The fact is that the US has no option but to work with Pakistan. It is not winning the war in Afghanistan despite claims to the contrary. It can reduce but not eliminate dependence on Pakistani air space and land routes for supplies to its troops in Afghanistan. The US threats of military action against Pakistan and aid cut-off lack credibility.
There is no assurance that unilateral US military action inside Pakistan would eliminate the Haqqani group’s fighters or seriously impair their fighting ability. Above all, expansion of US military action in Pakistan would endanger, if not destroy, the ongoing cooperation with Pakistan in the intelligence and other fields and destabilise the entire region.
Even the option of cutting military and economic aid or linking it to tighter conditions will not persuade Pakistan to change its policies on a vital national security issue such as Afghanistan. But in the bargain Washington would lose the leverage which comes with providing such assistance.
Panetta told the Armed Services Committee that the US would “use as much pressure as we can.” In the past, this approach has worked. But the case of the Haqqani network is different. Here, the army has little flexibility. The decision of the corps commanders on Sept 25 not to launch any operation against the group was in fact the only option. Even if the army were inclined otherwise, it has its hands full dealing with the Pakistani Taliban and is in no position to take on the formidable fighting force that the Haqqanis command.
Washington seems to have recognised this and has begun to soft-pedal its demands. Officials of the White House, Pentagon and State Department last week carefully refused to back Mullen’s comments. Some senior US military officials have admitted privately that there is no evidence that the ISI had directed or orchestrated the attacks in Wardak and Kabul. Last Friday, Obama himself declined to endorse Mullen’s allegations against Pakistan, saying “the intelligence is not as clear as we might like.”
The tension in Pakistan-US relations created by US allegations of Pakistani involvement in the Haqqani group’s operations is being defused. But the underlying problems remain and these problems stem from divergent, even conflicting, perspectives and goals, not only over Afghanistan but also on Pakistan’s place and role in the wider region.
Stephen Cohen wrote last July that India is a friend, but not an ally; and that Pakistan is an ally, but not a friend. In an interview given shortly before the Kabul attack by the Haqqanis, US vice president Joe Biden said that Pakistan has been an unreliable ally. “It’s in their interest that they be more cooperative with us. We are demanding it.” That is surely unusual language to use for an “ally.”
The fact is that Pakistan has been treated by the US neither as an ally, nor a friend. This is especially true since the US decision in 2005 to “make India a global power” and to “de-hyphenate” Pakistan and India. In pursuance of this decision, India has received huge favours: a nuclear deal that gives a boost to India’s nuclear programme; endorsement of India’s Security Council ambitions; sponsorship of India’s bid to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group; support for an expanded Indian role in East Asia; and help to enable India to realise its wish to dominate South and Central Asia, packaged as the “New Silk Road” project.
Pakistan, on the contrary, has been at the receiving end of threats, warnings, ultimatums and sanctions. We are, to use Kayani’s words, the most bullied “ally” of the US. The fault is entirely our own, or, to be precise, that of our self-seeking leaders and parasitic ruling class. Whether under Musharraf or Zardari, our governments have been interested only in prolonging their rules and preserving and adding to their leaders’ wealth and privileges.
In an interview with Reuters last week, Gilani complained plaintively that if the US is a friend of Pakistan, it would not be refusing our demand for access to civilian nuclear technology. That is no way of conducting diplomacy. If Gilani is serious, he should make it clear to Washington that if it wants our cooperation in its war in Afghanistan, it must enter into a nuclear deal with Pakistan on the same terms as those given to India. Washington will have to pay heed.